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When migration from island states to larger states in the South Pacific
began, its significance was seen primarily in terms of its effects on island
populations. Emigration of young migrants could reduce rising popula-
tion growth rates and relieve pressure on limited resources. For planners it
could reduce the numbers of people for whom services had to be provided.
For those concerned with economic development, it raised the possibility
of repatriation of capital and skills in the medium term. For politicians it
could reduce, at least temporarily, pressure for politically unpopular
reforms. Migration's significance as a source of remittance income was
only fully appreciated as the numbers of migrants and the volume of
remittances grew.
To politicians in general, and finance ministers in particular, remit-
tances are an attractive form of revenue. They generate essential foreign
currency reserves. In the hands of recipients they generate a demand for
goods and services. Various forms of duty and excise can be levied on
imported goods and services. In turn the production and distribution of
goods and services generates commercial activity. Commercial activity
generates wage employment and company profits, both of which can be
taxed. The financial transactions themselves generate revenue for govern-
ment trading operations such as post offices, and for operations such as
commercial banks, in which governments have interests. Remittances that
are saved provide capital which can be further loaned locally to finance
development. In the short term these loans generate interest, and in the
The Contemporary Pacific, Volume 4, Number I, Spring I992, I09-I35
© I992 by University ofHawaii Press
109
lIO THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· SPRING 1992
longer term, they may produce viable enterprises whose profits can be
taxed.
To persons involved in development, as well as politicians, remittance
revenue is an attractive alternative to certain forms of tied economic aid. It
is available without surrendering economic sovereignty to agencies such as
the International Monetary Fund. It requires little in the way of adminis-
---ft~tiveinfrastructure.-It -does notrequire an-expensive specialist-bureau-
cracy to meet complex application, documentation, and accounting
requirements. In effect, remittance revenue is distributed and adminis-
tered by its "donors" and accounted for by its "recipients." This obviates
the necessity to choose between competing claims that might later become
the focus of political accusation.
Remittance revenue is attractive to governments. As long as popula-
tions have such supplementary sources of income, their expectations of
government expenditure may be contained. Where remittance income can
be channeled into community projects, it effectively subsidizes govern-
ment expenditure on capital works. Where the income is used to offset
poor commodity prices, it relieves pressure on governments to intervene
in areas where the probability of successful intervention is low. When
there is a deficit between what people receive in remittances and what
they believe they need, donors rather than governments are held respon-
sible.
For all of these reasons, remittances have grown in importance despite
evidence that they may also have negative social and economic conse-
quences for economic development (Shankman 1976). While different
states depend to different degrees on remittance income, the trend has
been toward a steady increase in the volume and value of remittances, and
in their significance within island budgets.
Despite the evidence of some negative consequences, acceptance of the
fact of remittances is probably a realistic approach on the part of Pacific
Island politicians. Such factors as periodic natural disasters; generally
poor price outlooks for many traditional crops; increasing freight costs
and evidence of agricultural protectionism on the part of some trading
partners; the vulnerability of tourism to fuel prices, threats of terrorism
and wars (IBP Feb 1991, 36-38); a lack of awareness of the Pacific states'
existence in major markets (PIM, April 1991, 36); vulnerability of local
manufacturing to competition from imports and to protectionism in mar-
kets for manufactured output (PIM, April 1991, 32); and the probable
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decline of aid flows as donors' economies contract and their interests shift
(ESCAP 1991; PIM, April 1991, 22-23) all highlight the value of diversifying
sources of revenue. Furthermore, attempts to control freely contracted
flows would be politically untenable.
Pacific Island states are continually seeking new sources of revenue-by
applying new technology to existing resources such as Manihiki's pearl
production; by exploiting-hitherto unexploited natural resources -such -as-
submarine manganese deposits; by developing new high-value crops such
as pepper (Pacific Magazine, May-June, 1991, 54-55); by selling high-
value by-products such as shark fin into specialized markets such as China
(IBP, II Feb 1991, 39); or by creating and selling new commodities such as
passports, gold coins, stamps, offshore banking services, or shipping
registries.! Unless the island states can generate one or more such sources
of revenue, remittances are likely to remain important. Their steadily
growing volumes have led politicians, planners, and researchers to focus
on the ways in which remittances are put to use. Until recently, there has
been little reason to consider the issue of the viability of remittance income
and the possibility that it might decline. 2 Only now are people, such as
economist Denis Ahlburg, starting to consider this question.
The questions raised are Can remittance flows be sustained? and Will
remittance flows be sustained? The first question is primarily a technical
one: Are there enough island-born or island-linked people in the labor
forces of industrialized countries to generate a given level of remittances to
the island states? The second question is a sociological one: Will those
who are able to sustain the flow be willing to? In this paper I examine the
case of remittance flows between New Zealand and Western Samoa.
Although such a study may seem at first to have limited relevance, it is a
classic case of a particular type of relationship, between a peripheral state
and a semiperipheral state, for which good data exist. Generic factors
such as the consequences of capital restructuring in industrial states, fiscal
crises of capitalist states, the changing demographic composition of
migration streams, and cultural and lifestyle changes in migrant popula-
tions are present in various combinations in all relationships of this type.
Here I propose to identify the factors and develop linkages between them
in one situation, then suggest how these factors and linkages might be rel-
evant in others. In the early part of the paper I address the first question
and the specific factors that may influence migrant Samoans' ability to
sustain historically high remittance flows. In the second part I turn to the
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second question and the factors that may dispose Western Samoan
migrants in New Zealand to continue to remit.
CAN REMITTANCE LEVELS BE SUSTAINED?
My analysis of this issue sets aside the question of whether growth rates
will-be sustaineu. Since -as-early -as T97S--the -a-dvisors -of---the--Western- - --- ---
Samoan government have tended to presume that they would grow, if at a
slower rate. For instance, Western Samoa's third five-year development
plan contains the following comment:
Unrequited Transfers are difficult to forecast, but it is reasonable to expect
some continuation of their past rapid growth, which averaged 25 percent a
year between 1965 and 1974, and 29 percent a year between 1970 and 1974 on a
trendline basis. However, recession conditions in New Zealand and the United
States may temporarily restrain this growth. As shown in table 3, projected
unrequited transfers (a large part of which is private remittances) constitute a
major source of financing of the trade deficit. Projections are made for a 15 per-
cent annual rate of increase. (Western Samoa 1975, 39)
Ahlburg, using general assumptions, has suggested that remittances to
Western Samoa are unlikely to grow (1991). In the short term, he argues,
remittances are likely to level out and in the long term to decline, as has
already begun to occur in Tonga. My focus, instead, is on whether exist-
ing volumes from Samoan migrants in New Zealand can be maintained,
and on a series of recently implemented political, economic, and immigra-
tion policies that foreshadow an even lower volume of remittances. The
New Zealand case is important because the largest number of Western
Samoan migrants reside in New Zealand. Differences in detail may exist
compared to other states in which Western Samoans work, but there are
important general similarities between the labor markets of New Zealand,
Australia, and the United States. The factors underlying this analysis of
the Samoan case are that demand for unskilled and semiskilled labor in
New Zealand has declined and is unlikely to return to previous levels; that
incomes of migrants are falling and with them discretionary income levels;
that the Samoan-born migrant population is aging; and that it is not clear
that their New Zealand-born children will replace them as remitters.
The emergence of the present situation requires some understanding of
the economic circumstances that existed in New Zealand during the early
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phases of migration; of the ways these have changed recently; and of the
likely future course. Economic circumstances have a marked impact on
both present and future demands for migrant labor, on migrants' incomes,
and on their capacity to remit.
The Good Times
____UntiLrecently,migration-from-Western-Samoa to-New-ZealaIld-has-rUIl-at- -- - - --
fairly consistent levels. As earlier migrants achieved major goals in Samoa,
such as home construction and vehicle purchase, and assumed new
responsibilities in New Zealand, they gradually reduced their contribu-
tions to Samoa. But as new migrants joined the labor force, their higher
level of contributions offset those of the earlier migrants. Over time, as the
volume of new migrants grew steadily, remittance volumes continued to
increase. This growth was based on economic policies of successive New
Zealand governments in the period between 1950 and 1983. The policies
were designed to diversify New Zealand's productive base by creating a
sheltered economic climate in which local secondary industry could
become established. Goods produced were intended to reduce demand for
imports and could, with appropriate subsidies, eventually be exported.
These protectionist policies brought considerable growth and economic
prosperity to New Zealand. For much of the period, high primary com-
modity prices underwrote their costs. However, growth of the protected
industries rapidly exhausted locally available labor and generated a more
or less continuous demand for migrant labor, which was drawnvprimarily
from northwestern Europe and the Pacific islands with which New
Zealand had colonial ties.
The Emerging Crisis
In the late 1970S falling demand for primary products, the restriction of
access to traditional markets, and protectionist policies applied by New
Zealand's major trading partners to primary produce, led to falling com-
modity prices and serious trade and budget deficits. In turn, these circum-
stances caused problems for the New Zealand government in the late
1970S and early 1980s. The state faced a classic fiscal crisis. Successive
governments found it increasingly difficult to fund the economic and wel-
fare programs developed by earlier administrations without further over-
seas borrowings and increasing debt-servicing charges.
In 1984 a Labour government was elected with a set of monetarist eco-
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nomic policies designed, it claimed, to address this problem. That govern-
ment embarked on a radical program of deregulation. Among its early
moves was the removal of subsidies and tariff protection to encourage the
redeployment and more effective application of capital. Many industries
did not survive in the new climate. Some were closed, others failed. Those
that survived did so by reducing costs of production. Some mechanized
and--automat~dpI'Ocesses;-someshed labor; -some-'~portable"industries
were relocated to countries with low-wage economies such as Fiji or Thai-
land; some simply switched from producing products to importing them.
As emphasis shifted from productive capital, some capital formerly used
in production was converted into more mobile forms and redeployed out-
side New Zealand. These policies rapidly pushed historically low unem-
ployment rates upward.
The Labour government sought to reduce state spending by transform-
ing the public sector. A number of operations were converted from gov-
ernment departments into state-owned enterprises. The managements of
these enterprises were required to adopt commercial management philoso-
phies, objectives, and styles and to produce dividends acceptable to the
government. Under pressure to operate commercially and to produce divi-
dends, these enterprises sought to reduce costs by much the same means as
commercial organizations, including, among other things, reducing their
labor force significantly. Operations that could not for various reasons be
"corporatized" were encouraged to review their organization and reduce
costs. The net effect was a dramatic reduction in the size of the public ser-
vice, with consequent losses of employment and still higher unemploy-
ment rates.
Over the period I984 to I99I, both the general unemployment rate and
the rate for unskilled people rose steadily. From historically low rates of
around 0.7 percent unemployment in the early I960s when migration was
gaining speed, the general rate had grown to 6.8 percent in I986 (NZ Offi-
cial Yearbook I990, 35I, 37I). The rate increased even more rapidly as
companies collapsed in the wake of the I987 sharemarket crash and had
reached 7.25 percent by March I990 (NZ Household Labour Force Sur-
vey, March I990) when an impatient electorate voted the Labour gov-
ernment out in a landslide. The speed of this growth is illustrated in Fig-
ure I.
In late I990, a National government came to power and chose to con-
tinue the policies of the previous administration. Faced with a growing
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I} Monthly average for years ending 31 December.
FIGURE 1. Unemployment Growth in New Zealand 1980-1989. Source: New
Zealand Official Yearbook, I990, 370.
public debt and its associated servicing costs, this administration chose to
reduce public spending still further despite some opposition to this strat-
egy within the party. Many politically "easier" options were no longer
available. Corporatization and the sale of government assets; more effi-
cient tax collection; the institution of a goods and services tax; implemen-
tation of user charges for a number of government services; cuts in size
and increases in efficiencies in government operations; and reductions in
government subsidies to industry and agriculture had all been largely
exhausted as sources of additional revenue.
The National government has opted for the least popular cuts-in the
welfare budget. In 1991 the government reduced the levels of all benefits
for adult unemployment, youth and training, sickness, sole parents, and
widows. Tougher criteria for eligibility for associated income supplements
were instituted, and an extended "stand down" period was introduced for
those who left jobs or became redundant. Furthermore, as of I March
1991, social welfare benefits paid to people illegally in New Zealand were
canceled and procedures put in place to prevent this group from applying
for benefits in the future (NZ Department of Social Welfare 1991).
In parallel moves to increase revenue the government moved to recover
part of the costs of certain of its services for which it was not already
charging. It instituted new charges and increased others and moved to
recover outstanding debts that had been allowed to accrue. For instance,
the government engaged a private debt-collection agency to recover NZ$77
million in outstanding spouse and child support payments from some
p 'fiWNl.!I!m!M'9
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II,OOO liable parents (New Zealand Herald, 30 April 1991). Moreover, the
minister of social welfare has announced that to ensure more efficient col-
lection in future, the Inland Revenue Department will from 1992 be
responsible for collecting amounts of between 18 percent (for one child)
and 36 percent (for five children) of absent parents' income, irrespective of
their present marital status (New Zealand Herald, 15 May 1991, 5). The
- -- ------ -- goxernmenLhas_instituted..new_and_ffio.r.e_effe.ctixe__computerizecL.prD_c.e:::. _
dures to exchange information between government agencies to ensure
that correct deductions from wages and salaries and benefit payments are
being made.
All of these policies affected low- and middle-income earners as well as
the growing numbers who had become dependent on the state for their
income as unemployment rose to 9.9 percent by March 1991 (NZ House-
hold Labour Force Survey March 1991). Figure 2 shows the impact of
these measures on real disposable income for various groups of New
Zealanders.
The government is still enacting legislation designed to reduce its
spending, and the full impact of these policies has yet to be felt. For
instance, those who remain employed have not experienced the full effects
of recently enacted industrial relations legislation. Until now, a system of
nabonal industrial agreements has granted a measure of protection to the
employees covered. The Employment Contracts Act, designed to "free up
the labour market" and to "make New Zealand industry more competi-
tive," has reduced the power of labor unions by removing a compulsory
membership requirement, and has thereby removed some of the protec-
tion they have provided in the labor market. Employees, who have
depended on industry-wide unions to negotiate national conditions of
employment, will now have either to negotiate individual contracts with
their employers or to engage an authorized negotiating agent to represent
their group. The combined effects of a shrinking demand for labor and a
loss of union representation may lead to still further reductions in wage
levels. Some groups of employers are already using the present combina-
tion of circumstances to negotiate awards from which long-standing pro-
visions for penalty payments of various types have been removed. This is
most likely to occur in the sectors where the demand for labor is weakest,
such as unskilled and semiskilled activities.
These factors have influenced the financial situations of all New
Zealanders in the I980s, but they have affected subpopulations in differ-
~.0;. Base: Year ended March 198r = 1000.
FIGURE 2. Real Disposable Income Indexes, 1980-1989. Source: New Zealand Official Yearbook, I999' 381.
I
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ent ways. Some, including Samoan migrants, have been more seriously
affected by restructuring than others.
IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES FOR SAMOANS
In this section I examine how Samoans were affected, and what effects this
might have-had-on-their discretienaryinGeme-levels and-indiFeGtly-on their
capacity to remit. Given the distribution of income of Samoans shown in
Table I, it was inevitable that the recession would affect their discretion-
ary income levels.
In 1986, before the full impact of government policies pushed incomes
lower, 43.04 percent of Samoan income earners (compared with 27.56 per-
cent of the total population) fell in the bottom income quintile, a group
whose real disposable income had declined steadily between 1980 and
Table 1. Distribution ofIncome in New Zealand, 1986
Income Group Samoans'f Total Populationt
NZ$ % %
< 2,500 17.99 7.11
2,501-5,000 4.78 5.21
5,001-7,500 8.01 7.62
7,501-10,000 12.26 9.68
10,001-15,000 24.59 21.39
15,001-20,000 11.97 18.68
20,001-25,000 3.77 12.05
25,001-30,000 1.39 7.06
30,001-40,000 0.71 5.17
>40,000 0.17 3.02
Sources: Samoan data from Department of Statistics; Total population data from
New Zealand Official Yearbook, I990, Table 12.II (P376).
Notes: ':- Of the 39,288 Samoans employed in New Zealand in 1986, 14.29 percent
did not specify their income.
t The total number of New Zealanders employed for wages in 1986 was
1,608,612.
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1989 (see Figure 2). But although the data in Figure I might indicate a
gradual decline to which people could adjust, for many Samoans the pro-
cess was more sudden than the aggregate pattern suggests.
Despite some significant differences in the profiles of various Pacific
Island subpopulations and evidence of recent upward social mobility on
the part of Samoans (Bedford and Didham, 1989), in 1986 they were still
___ conc~ntrate_d,_with_othecP.acificJslanders,-in -sector:s -that-sustaiu@(l-h@a- --
job losses very rapidly as Table 2 shows.
Ironically, the same chain migration process that had allowed Samoans
to "colonize" particular industries effectively throughout the 1960s and
1970S (Pitt and Macpherson 1974) and had concentrated them in particu-
lar industrial activities, made them particularly vulnerable to labor re-
trenchment in both public and private sectors.
By March 1991, the rate of unemployment for Pacific Islanders as a
group had risen to 27.2 percent, well ahead of the national figure of 9.9
percent. From 1987 to 1991 the number of Pacific Islanders employed has
dropped by 24.9 percent from 44,200 to 33,200. While Samoans may have
fared slightly better than other Pacific Island populations for various rea-
sons, they cannot escape what is a national phenomenon. Economic
downturns do not distinguish between loyal and less loyal, well-educated
and less well educated work forces. The Samoan subpopulation is the
Table 2. Pacific Islander Unemployment Rates in New Zealand, r986-r990
Pacific Island Polynesian Total Population
Male Female Male Female
1986 6.4 8.2 3.6 5.1
1987 5.3 6.0 3.7 4.7
1988 12.2 8.5 4.9 5.2
1989 20.2 12.8 7.5 7.1
1990 21.3 14.0 7.4 7.1
1991 29.0 25.4 NA NA
Source: NZ Department of Statistics Household Labour Force Survey, March
quarters.
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largest of the Pacific Island subpopulations in New Zealand and would
have been expected to have sustained the heaviest job losses where all
other things were equal. Furthermore, the character of unemployment
itself has changed as the recession has deepened. Those who become
unemployed remain on benefits for longer periods. The average length of
time rose from 6.7 weeks in 1975 to 18.1 weeks in 1985 and 33.8 weeks in
June 19903 (McCardle, 199x).-
The victims of the retrenchment found their incomes declining progres-
sively, first as working hours were reduced, then again as they moved
from full-time jobs in the secondary industries to even shorter hours in ser-
vice sector jobs; then as those jobs disappeared onto various welfare bene-
fits, and finally as welfare benefits were cut. While unemployment has
serious consequences for credit worthiness and makes it difficult to bor-
row, the lengthening period of unemployment leads to erosion of savings.
The situation has been further exacerbated by the arrival of migrants
who are not able to enter the work force. This was in part the conse-
quence of a 1982 judgment of the Privy Council, which established that
persons born in Western Samoa between 13 May 1924 and 31 December
1948-the period in which New Zealand administered Western Samoa-
or their descendants, were in fact New Zealand citizens (Macdonald 1986,
77). The Privy Council's decision could have had dramatic effects on the
volume of migration between New Zealand and Western Samoa. In a
series of hastily convened meetings the governments of New Zealand and
Western Samoa agreed to nullify the effect of the judgment, but not before
a number of people had taken advantage of the temporary opportunity to
migrate. Despite the shrinking market for unskilled labor and changes in
immigration regulations that reduced the number of employment oppor-
tunities, Samoans continued to migrate to New Zealand throughout this
period. In fact, as Table 3 shows, the largest net migration gains occurred
in the years when the economy was deteriorating and unemployment rates
were rising most rapidly, a trend not reversed until 1990.
Many of those who migrated between 1986 and 1991 arrived during a
brief visa-free period (Larner and Bedford, 1990) and remained illegally,
or were adult "adoptees" or parents who were permitted to enter under the
family reunification provisions of the immigration legislation. Many of
those who entered illegally found only poorly paid part-time or casual
work, and those who could not find work became dependent to various
degrees on their relatives for maintenance. Adult adoptees who could not
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Table 3. Samoan Migration Flows to New Zealand, 1982-199°
121
Year Arrivals Departures Net
1982 10,298 9,468 830
-1-98~- 10,96-2-- ---9~017 -1-;~J4- -
1984 10,067 7,912 2,155
1985 10,358 8,528 1,830
1986 12,531 9,990 2,541
1987 16,594 12,961 3,633
1988 18,616 15,432 3,184
1989 19,262 14,907 4,355
1990 13,572 13,636 -64
Source: Excerpted from Lamer and Bedford r990, Appendix rb.
find work ended up on relatively low fixed incomes from welfare benefits.
Few of those parents brought to New Zealand were entitled to benefits,
and in most cases migrants were required to enter an agreement with the
government that made them responsible for the costs of their parents'
maintenance.
The effect of falls in real disposable income, increasing rates of unem-
ployment and benefit dependency, and the growing numbers of new arriv-
als who will not enter paid employment have had a profound impact on
many Samoan households' discretionary income over the six years in
which these policies have been in place. The amount available for remit-
tances has necessarily declined. Because costs remained more or less con-
stant as incomes declined, many Samoan families found their discretion-
ary income shrinking.
The full effects of the government's social and economic policies have
not yet been felt. The government has tabled legislation designed to limit
the numbers of persons who can enter the country as New Zealand citi-
zens and therefore eligible for work or, where no work is available, for
unemployment benefits. In the social area, for instance, the attorney-gen-
eral has announced his intention to speed passage of the Citizenship
Amendment Bill, which would remove provisions for recognizing overseas
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adoptions for citizenship purposes. In the recent past this provision has
allowed as many as eight hundred Western Samoan "children," a dispro-
portionate number of whom are aged between sixteen and twenty-one, to
enter New Zealand as citizens in any given year. The attorney-general has
also indicated that the same legislation will seek to control marriages of
convenience that have permitted illegally resident Samoans to claim citi-
-. --- -- zenship-(-Nt?w-.cealand-Herafd,6--May-:r99:I,--I-)-;-+his-ana- pIanneEl-eG0~------
nomic measures are likely to make the situation worse by limiting the
growth of numbers of potential remitters and by reducing their incomes.
The effects of these policies become clearer when examined in the light
of the size and sources of a family's income, its available disposable
income, and its capacity to remit either cash or commodities to Western
Samoa. What follows is a brief case study of the political economy of a
particular family, but it may, with modifications, be used to model the
ramifications for other types of family.
A Case Study
The family household consists of a married couple, their four school-age
children, and two illegally resident relatives who contributed to household
and family expenses in both Western Samoa and New Zealand. They live
in a South Auckland suburb in a three-bedroom home purchased in 1977
with a first mortgage from the government's Housing Corporation.
In 1983 the husband had a well-paid job as a foreman carpenter in com-
mercial construction. His wife had a full-time job in the service sector.
They received family benefits for each of the children and a family allow-
ance. One of the illegally resident relatives was employed in construction,
and the other, who had recently been made redundant, was receiving an
unemployment benefit (Table 4).
By 1987 the husband was on reduced hours as building work subsided
after the stockmarket crash reduced demand for new office space. His
wife's job had disappeared, and she had taken a half-time job in the ser-
vice sector at a lower hourly rate. The benefits they received remained at
the same level. The illegally resident builder's laborer had become unem-
ployed when a company in which he had worked for six years went bank-
rupt; he was receiving an unemployment benefit. The second illegally resi-
dent relative had had several part-time jobs in the interim but was again
unemployed.
By 1991 both husband and wife were unemployed and receiving an
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Table 4. Typical Weekly Household Income of Case Study Family, 1983-1991
(NZ$)
EARNINGS~OF'CORE MEMBERS
Primary earner
Secondary earner
SOCIAL WELFARE ENTITLEMENT
Family benefit (4 allowances)
Family support (4 children)
Income support
ANCILlARY MEMBERS
First illegal residentt
Second illegal resident!
TOTAL INCOME
1983
450
289
24
123
nil
143
375
1404
1987
430
120
24
123
nil
143
143
943
1991
44
113
nil
nil
450
Notes:
':. $293 is the unemployment rate for a married couple with two children and
includes a family assistance supplement. This could as easily be seen as a social
welfare entitlement.
t Unemployed throughout the period.
! Employed until 1987; employed intermittently since then.
unemployment benefit and a family supplement. The family benefits had
been incorporated into the family allowance payment, and the family had
reluctantly applied for an accommodation supplement to meet the mort-
gage payments on their home. Neither of the illegally resident relatives is
eligible for the unemployment benefit any longer and neither has been able
to find work.
The household's income has been dropping continually during a period
when their costs have risen steadily. Between 1980 and 1989 the consumer
price index rose 160 percent; some 70.13 percent of that increase occurred
between 1984 and 1989. These parallel processes resulted in a steady ero-
sion of disposable income (NZ Official Yearbook, I990, 614).
. 4 •
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The family has had to meet new costs resulting from the government's
new policy of partial cost recovery. School fees for four children, which in
1986 cost the family $200, now cost them $600 per year, and the school
administration has indicated that they are likely to rise again as the gov-
ernment seeks to cap education spending. The husband has two children
by a previous marriage living with his former wife for whom he makes a
-teken-flaYment.-If--th€ -g0vemment-pl."Oceeds-with-its-plan-torecoxeran
increasing percentage of child support costs from absent parents via
deductions from wages or benefits, the family income could be expected
to decline, and if the husband were to find paid employment, the level of
deductions would presumably increase.
The two illegally resident relatives, who were once "assets," have
become "liabilities" since their benefit ~ntitlements were terminated.
Where they formerly provided both labor and services and subsidized the
household's participation in activities in both Samoa and New Zealand,
they now make no contribution and must instead be supported on a
declining household income.
Between 1977 and 1989 the family's largest commitment, repayments on
their twenty-five-year first mortgage, increased steadily from around 8.5
percent to 15.4 percent as average home mortgage interest rates rose (NZ
Official Year Book I990, 519). The illegally resident relatives' income is no
longer available to subsidize this cost.
Other factors have further eroded the family's financial capacity. In the
past they were able to set aside little in the way of savings because of the
expenses of running a household and participating in various Samoan
activities. They had coped with periodic demands on their income by
using the equity in their home to raise larger amounts, by running a bingo
game to raise smaller amounts, and by borrowing within the kin group.
These strategies are no longer as readily available as they once were.
In the past, for instance, they had used the equity in their house to raise
additional short- and long-term finance to meet calls for assistance. They
could meet the relatively small payments, and their equity was increasing
as real estate values rose. As banks introduced simplifed procedures for
borrowing against home equity, it was possible to get additional funds rel-
atively quickly and inexpensively. The house represented an additional
source of finance in emergencies.
In 1987, when regular debt repayments for such items as a car were
starting to consume most of the household's shrinking income, the family
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reduced its outgoings by using the equity in the home to refinance other
more expensive hire-purchase debts into a larger first mortgage. In 1989,
to finance a major expense in Samoa, the family took a $5000 second
mortgage on the home with a finance company. Now, as their household
income shrinks, they have considerable difficulties in meeting these pay-
ments.
_The_ strategy_of refinancing on advantag(wl:ls teFms-isn010ngeravai1a~­
ble to this family. The declining value of their home, as a consequence of
declining real estate values, their deteriorating credit record as a conse-
quence of their tighter budget, and their limited ability to service further
debt on unemployment benefits means that their major asset can no longer
be used as an additional resource in emergencies.
The same is true of their second strategy. To generate additional capi-
tal, this household and a group of related households ran a fortnightly
bingo game for several years. Each of the households encouraged friends
and relatives to attend and play. The costs of the grocery "prizes" were
deducted from each evening's proceeds and the "profits" retained in a fund
to which members of the sponsoring households had access in case of
emergencies. The bulk of the fund was divided among members around
Christmas. A small amount, around $750, was retained to cover con-
tingencies until the club resumed in the new year. Over time, this activity
has yielded less and less as fewer people can afford to play, or play fewer
games on anyone evening. Once the fund contained as much as $7500,
which could be borrowed at nil or very low interest rates and was occa-
sionally given without expectation of repayment. The fund now rarely
goes above $1000 and is being eroded because borrowers cannot repay
even relatively small debts.
There are problems with the third strategy. In the past when people's
credit would not stand a loan, others had borrowed from this family
amounts of up to $1000, and they had from time to time borrowed similar
amounts from others. Now, because the problem is affecting all of those
involved in the same or similar ways, the chances of people having money
to lend are reduced.
Furthermore, their employment status means that it is virtually impos-
sible to obtain credit from other commercial sources, which generally
insist on given income levels as the bases for loans. There are still some
loan companies that will advance money in return for extraordinary secu-
rities over homes and chattels. Their activities have been the subject of
A W44IHPUi8MIQ dwapJWliPW'.'tBPllP'ti""''' tM3P5 Ii .£
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periodic public scrutiny from consumer organizations, and people are
now cautious of borrowing from them.
Similar calculations can be done for various types of household and will
yield similar results. In some cases the consequences are even more severe,
as for instance, when benefits are simply withdrawn from a household of
people illegally resident in New Zealand and they are are left with no
--income-.-
THE FUTURE
There will be fewer opportunities for new migrants to join the work force
and significant reductions of income for those who remain in it. Recently
adopted immigration policies will effectively discriminate against
unskilled and semiskilled workers. This policy effectively limits the num-
bers of potential migrants from Western Samoa to IlOO persons per year
entitled to permanent residence under a treaty, and those who qualify
under family reunification provisions of the legislation. If the immigration
points system were used to select the IlOO permanent residents it would
discriminate in favor of people with either capital or skills. Furthermore,
the quota sets the maximum rather than the minimum number of perma-
nent residents per year and, as Va'a (1991) noted, the New Zealand gov-
ernment has not always filled the annual quota and could choose not to in
the future.
The implications for remittance levels are obvious. At any given time
the Samoan remitting population consists of new, generally young, single,
migrants remitting large proportions of their income and older, married
residents remitting steadily declining proportions of their income (Mac-
pherson 1991a). Unless the stock of new migrants is replaced continu-
ously, the general level of remittances can be expected to fall steadily as
migrants go through the remitting cycle. A relatively small decline in the
number of new migrants could have a disproportionately large impact on
the total volume of remittances to Western Samoa.
Moreover, the family reunification policy can be expected over time to
lead to a reduction in the volume of remittances. As parents join their
migrant children in New Zealand, money that is presently remitted to
them in Samoa and spent there, will be spent instead in New Zealand. The
same can be expected of remittances to siblings presently in Samoa as they
too are permitted to join family in New Zealand under family reunifica-
tion provisions.
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There are New Zealand-born Samoans who are about to enter the
labor market in large numbers and could "replace" the immigrants pres-
ently in the work force. Significant numbers of New Zealand-born chil-
dren will enter the work force in the next ten years, as Table 5 shows.
If 20 percent of the 15-19 year cohort were to enter the labor market in
any given year the pool of potential remitters would increase steadily. But
- even-if-this happened there-would stiH-be-fewecnew-workers-ffom tnis- -
source than have traditionally been available from migration. However,
the earning potential of this group is probably higher than that of their
immigrant counterparts and their migrant parents, because they are better
prepared, in terms of cultural capital, for the work force.
Over time, increasing proportions of both male and female New
Zealand-born Samoans have entered professional, technical, administra-
tive, and managerial occupations, and the same trend is evident in clerical,
sales, and service jobs. Smaller proportions of the New Zealand-born
work force are found in the more vulnerable sectors: agriculture, produc-
tion, and transport (Bedford and Didham, 1989, tables 7a, 7b). If this
trend continues, New Zealand-born Samoans may be able to isolate
themselves more effectively than their parents from some of the effects of
restructuring. If their earnings are fed into remittances, it may well be pos-
sible to at least sustain levels.
This, however, presumes first that they will be able to enter the paid
labor force. Unemployment rates are high among young people. In 1986,
before the most severe effects of the recession were evident, 25.7 percent of
New Zealand-born Samoan males and 25.1 percent of Samoan females
aged between 15 and 19 years were unemployed and seeking work. These
Table 5. Age Structure of New Zealand-born Samoan Population, 1986
Age in years
<5
5-9
10-14
15-19
Males
4497
4092
3390
2319
Females
4161
3891
3204
2271
Totals
8658
7983
6594
4590
Source: 1986 Census via Department of Statistics.
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figures were only marginally lower than the 28.1 percent for island-born
males and 29.9 percent for island-born females in the same age group. It is
clear that the additional cultural capital the New Zealand-born bring to
the labor market cannot make a significant difference when that market is
generally depressed.
However, these figures may reflect another fact: that unemployment
- ------- ---rat~-s-<fre-highesr-among-lhose-with-few-formal-academie-qualifieatoiofls
(NZ Official Yearbook, 199°,371-372). Despite impressive gains in levels
of educational achievement, it remains a fact that in 1986 significant pro-
portions of New Zealand-born Samoans were leaving school without a
school qualification (Bedford and Didham 1989, tables 4a, 4b).
Those who do enter unskilled or semiskilled sectors of the work force
can expect to earn less than their parents earned doing the same jobs in
earlier times. Even the most optimistic model of the New Zealand econ-
omy suggests "that attempts to clear labour markets by adjusting wage
relativities would require very large drops in wage rates paid to semi- and
unskilled blue collar workers" (Rose 1990, 38). Those who are unable to
break into the work force can expect to spend prolonged periods on
unemployment and training benefits.
Even then, jobs that are available may not be as well paid because in the
recent past new part-time jobs have been created more rapidly than new
full-time jobs. 4 Between 1981 and 1986 the part-time male work force grew
by 52.1 percent and the part-time female work force by 4.0 percent (NZ
Official Yearbook, 1990, Table 12.3, pp. 365-366). By comparison, over
the same period the full-time male work force grew by only 1.4 percent
and the full-time female work force by 21.5 percent. Whether these trends
have continued into 1991 is not clear. While the number of part-time jobs
is small compared to full-time ones, if this trend continues it is probable
that many new male entrants to the work force will be employed in newly
created, lower paying, part-time positions. This may be only partly offset
by the rather higher rate of full-time jobs taken by females over the same
period.
It may be that the New Zealand-born cohort will enter a depressed
labor market and that not all will enter the paid work force in the short
term at least. While those with higher formal qualifications can expect to
earn higher incomes than their migrant parents, many with lower qualifi-
cations can expect to earn lower real incomes than their parents did. For
these people, the question of whether or not to remit discretionary income
to Samoa may simply not arise, at least in the short term.
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THE PROSPECT OF RECOVERY
The questions arise of whether this is a temporary situation and whether
after a brief lag, metropolitan economies will grow, job growth will
return, incomes will increase, and Samoans will be free to resume their
former levels of remittance. These questions are not easily answered since
-t-he--f>erf0Fmaneeofthe-New-Zealand-economy is onlyp-arrly deterffimed-
by internal factors and is significantly influenced by that of major trading
partners. Some indicators are available.
One model of the New Zealand economy, which outlines the require-
ments for a fully employed, high-income society (Rose 1990), notes that
even if new employment growth had commenced in 1988 and rates of 2.5
percent per year had been attained it would have taken until 1995 to attain
full employment. In a comment on the probability of such rates being
attained, the report states that although employment grew at an average
compound rate of 2.3 percent between 1962 and 1977, "that was a long
time ago and in a quite different environment" (Rose 1990, 3). In 1991 job
losses have continued and new employment growth rates are running well
behind those that would have been necessary to attain full employment by
1995. The prospect of a return to full employment in the next decade
seems remote. The Treasury's longest estimates, published with the 1991
Budget, are for the rate to increase to 12.1 percent by 1992-1993 (New
Zealand Herald, 31 July 1991, I). Even then, for the reasons given, full
employment may mean people working fewer hours in lower-paid service-
sector jobs.
Even if "full employment" were to return, it is unlikely that all Western
Samoans presently in New Zealand would be able to take advantage of
the new situation. In mid-May 1991, New Zealand Minister of Labour the
Honourable Bill Birch announced that the government intended to repa-
triate people illegally resident in New Zealand. When the number of ille-
gal residents has grown on previous occasions, the government has
offered amnesties during which people could come forward, register, and
make a case for remaining in the country. Many people have come to
believe that if they could remain in New Zealand for long enough and
secure employer endorsement for their case, they would eventually be able
to obtain residency. However, the minister, claiming the support of Pacific
Island community leaders, has announced that this policy has rewarded
people for violating immigration regulations and that a series of amnesties
has led people to believe that they had simply to wait long enough to nor-
..
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malize their immigration status. He has indicated that no amnesty will be
offered and that those in the country illegally can expect to be deported.
Prosecution of such a policy could reduce, by as many as 7500, the num-
ber of Samoans who would be available for work as the economy
rebounded. If one assumes that each of these people might, after an eco-
nomic recovery, have earned NZ$450 per week in wages, their deportation
woul<l-mean-rnacrlrelm:o-me-ahhe-cummunity-would-be-approximately--------
$3,375,000 less per week. If one further assumes that 20 percent of that
income would have been remitted to Western Samoa, then the total remit-
ted would be some NZ$675,000 less per week or Nz$35,IOO,000 per year.
Another developmental model, known as the Porter Project, generated
for the government by a team led by an American academic economist,
Professor Porter, looks to build on commercial and technological advan-
tages New Zealand currently enjoys in a small number of specialized mar-
kets. The model the government appears to favor calls for a series of
developments in areas unlikely ever to generate a demand for significant
amounts of unskilled or semiskilled labor.
The question then becomes whether redeployment of human resources
could forestall the fall in remittances. The Samoan family, as various
authors have noted, operates as a transnational kin corporationS and
moves its resources around to take advantage of opportunities in different
markets. In the past people have been moved between New Zealand, Aus-
tralia, and the United States. It should then be possible to move under-
employed and unemployed people from labor markets in which demand is
weak to those in which demand is stronger to increase the rate of return
on human capital. However, there are real limits to such a strategy.
First, the metropolitan economies are linked to one another within the
world economic system. Because of the nature of the linkages when one,
such as the United States, is weak demand tends to weaken in the others,
such as New Zealand and Australia. There may be short lags between
weakening demand in one market and in another, particularly for Austra-
lia and New Zealand, which are increasingly closely linked. For instance,
Australia's recession had driven unemployment to 10.6 percent by March
1991. A labor force survey by the Bureau of Statistics showed that unem-
ployment had hit Pacific Islanders hard, with IO.9 percent of men and 13.4
percent of women out of work, and that the situation was worsening
(New Zealand Herald, 30 May 1991,18). The advantages of moving peo-
ple from one place to another may be only temporary and may just fore-
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stall the inevitable for reasons to be discussed. Furthermore, movement is
constrained by complex sets of immigration regulations that tend increas-
ingly to use point systems to establish eligibility in ways that discriminate
in favor of immigrants with capital and skills. The application of these
regulations would tend to work against the relatively free movement of
many intending Western Samoan migrants.
-- -- - .- -Second,-thethree-states·amorrg-which-m()st -g-amoans-move-are--uilder--- - - _.-
going comparable types of capital restructuring, which results in the relo-
cation of much secondary industry and the growth of a service sector in its
place. The controllers of capital in each of the states seek means of arrest-
ing falling rates of return on invested capital and typically employ similar
strategies-by exporting large numbers of jobs to low-wage economies of
the third world and by capital intensification, that is, replacement of labor
by automation, mechanization, and computerization. Automation and
mechanization become additional means of reducing labor costs. The
pace of discovery and application of new technologies is accelerating, and
costs are falling rapidly. As yet the range of applications for computer-
based technology is only in its infancy and its costs, while falling, are still
relatively high. It is unlikely that industries in these states will ever gener-
ate the demand for Samoan labor that they once did.
Third, the crises these capitalist states face have certain generic charac-
teristics. They are fiscal crises of late capitalism and force states to reduce
the size and scope of social welfare programs to reduce the costs. In this
context, states move to restrict immigration and to remove illegal immi-
grants. New Zealand, the United States, and most recently Australia (PIM,
April 1991, 21) have all moved in this direction, and as domestic unem-
ployment rates grow, it becomes increasingly difficult to persuade elector-
ates that continued immigration is in the best interest of the domestic
economy.
The next questions to arise are whether migrants, under increasing
financial pressure, will continue to believe that remittances are a worth-
while investment for discretionary income, and whether their children can
in turn be persuaded that this is the case. Those migrants who have close
relatives in the village, who plan to return permanently to Samoa, and
who aspire to an active role in village leadership may continue to remit in
the belief that remittances are turned into sociopolitical capital on which
they can draw later. Those whose close relatives move to New Zealand,
who plan only occasional visits to Samoa, and who do not aspire to lead-
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ership may invest discretionary income in New Zealand instead as their
interests become centered there. 6
Are New Zealand-born children of Samoan descent as committed to
Samoa as their parents? There is probably no single answer to this ques-
tion. Recent studies of Samoan and Tongan migrants have shown that
they typically remit less than 40 percent of the amount that their parents
remit--:-TBut -if-iSnoCslmplythara:ll-fuigYanrcnlloretnemfde-s-nrran-th-eir
parents. Children exhibit quite different orientations to Samoan culture,
custom, and language and to the villages with which they have connec-
tions (Macpherson 1984; 1991a; 1991b). While some may continue to
maintain links with Samoa through remittances, many will not, for a vari-
ety of reasons. These issues are necessarily the subject of another paper.
If this forecast is correct, it has serious ramifications for the state of
Western Samoa. Remittance income has for several decades made a signif-
icant contribution to the reduction of trade deficits. If deficits were to
worsen significantly, international agencies might insist, as a condition of
their continued assistance, on further austerity measures, a situation that
could generate considerable political unrest. The availability of remit-
tances has permitted people to meet their growing material aspirations.
Remittances have provided significant parts of the costs of community
facilities such as churches, schools, and dispensaries; major individual
assets such as homes, freehold land, and vehicles; and the more mundane
daily items such as school uniforms and fees, and imported food. If remit-
tances are no longer available to meet these costs, the people may look
increasingly to the government to meet them. In the present circumstances
the government would not be well placedto do this and its inability could
contribute to further political volatility.
There is evidence that Western Samoan politicians are becoming aware
of the possibility that both remittances and international aid flows to
Samoa may be waning. 8 However, they may have considerable difficulty
persuading an electorate used to readily available remittances that the cri-
sis and the need for action are real. By the time the reality of the situation
becomes apparent, it may be much more difficult to persuade an impatient
electorate to plan rationally for greater national self-sufficiency. Further-
more as Fairbairn has noted, although Samoan society has proved
immensely resilient in the face of a number of challenges, the longer a soci-
ety remains dependent on external sources of revenue, the more difficult it
becomes to reinstate the social and economic foundations of earlier,
higher levels of self-sufficiency (1985, IIO-136).
Of,
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Notes
I Even these are temporary solutions. Their success in one state encourages
others and before long the "market" is shared by more players. Furthermore,
states that are losing tax revenue seek ways of eliminating such practices as off-
shore banking. While the Cook Islands has recently won the approval of the
Hong Kong securities authorities as an alternative domicile for local companies,
the British Inland Revenue Service is probing the activities of twenty states,
including Vanuatu, which offer offshore banking services to British nationals
(PIM, April 1991, 32).
2 Ironically, as this article is written, remittances from expatriate Samoans in
the wake of Cyclone Ofa have pushed bank deposits to levels at which both the
Bank of Western Samoa and the Pacific Commercial Bank are losing money on
money on deposit because the money cannot be on-lent (PIM, April 1991, 33).
However, periodic gestures of this scale can be usefully separated from histori-
cally "normal" levels. In the wake of Ofa , for instance, remittances ran 70 percent
ahead of the levels for the same two weeks in the previous year.
3 This figure is the average length of time people returning to the workforce
have received unemployment benefits. Other calculations, such as the average
duration of unemployment for all currently unemployed, would produce different
and possibly more useful figures.
4 Part-time refers to jobs in which fewer than 30 hours per week are worked;
full-time, more than 30 hours per week.
S A full discussion of the debate on metaphors for Pacific Islander migration,
including a discussion of the transnational kin corporation, can be found in
Hayes 1991.
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6 This does not mean that they will cease to participate in Samoan activities
but rather that they will increasingly invest their time and energy in the raft of
religious, political, and family activities that has developed among Samoan
migrants.
7 I am indebted to Denis Ahlburg for this information.
8 In a speech reported on Hawaii Public Radio (2 August 1991), Prime Minis-
ter Tofilau Eti Alesana of Western Samoa warned Samoans of the need to reduce
the nation's dependence on external sources of funds.
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